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IN THE LITIGATION BUSINESS: INSURANCE COMPANY
LIABILITY FOR ACTS OCCURRING IN THE COURSE OF
LITIGATION UNDER THE WASHINGTON CONSUMER
PROTECTION ACT
Kasey D. Huebner
Abstract: Insurance companies generally have much greater bargaining power and
resources than individual insureds When a claim by an insured against an insurance company
fails to settle amicably and is followed by a lawsuit, the insured has few options should the
insurance company behave unfairly or deceptively in the course of the litigation. The
Washington Consumer Protection Act protects consumers from deceptive and bad faith acts
by businesses, including insurance companies Although Washington courts have created a
general exception disallowing CPA suits for acts occurring in the course of litigation,
Washington case law has not directly or clearly addressed whether this litigation exception
applies in the insurance context. This Comment argues that the CPA allows for a cause of
action by insureds against insurance companies for bad acts occurring after a suit has been
filed The rationale behind the litigation exception to the CPA does not apply to the insurance
industry, and Washington statutes, regulations, and case law support allowing CPA suits for
unfair or deceptive acts by an insurance company occurring in the course of litigation.
Dana was driving alone in her car when another motorist, Tom, hit her
from behind while driving at 35 miles per hour.' As a result, Dana
suffered a broken sternum, knee injuries, and a concussion, and her car
was totaled. Tom admitted to Dana that he was uninsured, so Dana made
a claim with her insurance company under her uninsured motorist policy.
The insurance company denied Dana's claim, alleging in good faith that
Tom was insured at the time of the accident. Dana continued to assert
that Tom was uninsured and sued her insurance company under her
uninsured motorist policy. After Dana's suit had been filed, but before
final verdict or settlement the insurance company discovered that Tom
was indeed uninsured, but continued to argue against Dana's uninsured
motorist claim. Dana later discovered that the insurance company had
knowledge that Tom was uninsured while it continued to fight her claim.
Should Dana be able to assert a claim against her insurance company
under the Consumer Protection Act (CPA)?
Washington courts have not addressed whether or not Dana would
have a claim against her insurance company under the CPA for deceptive
acts occurring in the course of litigation. The Washington State
Legislature enacted the CPA to protect consumers from unfair and
927
1. Hypothetical created by the author.
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deceptive business practices.2 Under the CPA, consumers can bring
private suits against individuals and businesses that engage in unfair or
deceptive business practices that affect the public.' These private CPA
suits allow for recovery of up to treble damages, as well as attorney's
fees.' Both the Insurance Commissioner of Washington, pursuant to a
legislative grant of authority,' and Washington courts have determined
that private CPA suits may be brought against insurance companies.6
However, the Washington Court of Appeals has characterized
litigation between a consumer and a business as a private dispute
between individuals.7 The court has held that because litigation is a
private dispute, acts by a business occurring after a consumer has filed a
suit cannot subject the business to liability under the CPA.' The court has
also held that there is an exception to the litigation exception for acts that
the Legislature has determined to be per se unfair or deceptive.9 In many
cases in which a business acts deceptively during litigation, consumers
must rely upon Court Rule 11 (CR 11) to provide a means for recovery. "
This Comment discusses whether insureds should be able to bring
CPA claims against insurance companies for acts occurring in the course
of litigation and argues that the litigation exception to the CPA should
not apply in the insurance context. Legislative and judicial findings
specific to the insurance industry suggest that an insured should be able
to fulfill the requirements of a CPA cause of action against an insurance
company for acts occurring in the course of litigation."1 Even assuming
that the litigation exception does apply in the insurance context, insureds
should still be able to bring suit against insurance companies under the
exception to the litigation exception because the Insurance
Commissioner has outlined specific acts which are per se unfair or
deceptive in the business of insurance.'2 Judicially and legislatively
created policies regarding the insurance industry, 3 and the fact that CR
2. 1961 WASH. LAWS 216 (codified at WASH. REV. CODE §§ 19.86.010-.920 (2000)).
3. See infra notes 26-35 and accompanying text.
4. WASH. REv. CODE § 19.86.090. Treble damages, however, are capped at $10,000. Id.
5. Id.
6. See infra Part I.B. 1.
7. Blake v. Federal Way Cycle Ctr., 40 Wash. App. 302, 312, 698 P.2d 578, 584 (1985).
8. Id.
9. Evergreen Collectors v. Holt, 60 Wash. App. 151, 156, 803 P.2d 10, 13 (1991).
10. See infra Part II.B.
11. See infra Part W.A.
12. See infra Part IV.B.
13. See infra Part IV.C.
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11 does not provide insureds with sufficient remedies, a lend further
support to the argument that insurance companies should be liable under
the CPA for their acts occurring in the course of litigation.
This Comment argues that the CPA establishes a cause of action
against insurance companies for deceptive acts occurring after a suit has
been filed by an insured. Part I describes the history of the CPA and
includes a discussion of the five requirements for a private claim under
the Act. Part II discusses the litigation exception to CPA causes of action
and alternate means of recovery for deceptive acts occurring after a suit
has been filed. Part I explains how the CPA applies to the insurance
industry. Part IV argues that the litigation exception to the CPA should
not apply to the insurance industry because the justification for the
exception does not apply in the insurance context, current policies
regarding the insurance industry support allowing suit in this situation,
and current remedies under CR 11 are not sufficient.
I. THE WASHINGTON STATE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT
The Legislature enacted the Consumer Protection-Unfair
Competition and Acts forty years ago to protect consumers from unfair
or deceptive business practices. ' In 1986, the Washington Supreme
Court established the current five-part test for a private cause of action
under the CPA.16 This test requires a complainant to show an unfair or
deceptive act or practice, occurring in the course of trade or commerce
that affects the public interest and causes harm to the consumers'
business or property. 7 Subsequent cases have acknowledged the liberal
construction afforded the CPA 8 due to the substantial public interests
involved.' 9
14. See infra Part lV.D.
15. See 1961 WASH. LAws 216 (codified at WASH. REV. CODE §§ 19.86.010-.920 (2000)) (these
regulations are now titled the Washington State Unfair Business Practices-Consumer Protection
Act).
16. See Hangman Ridge Training Stables, Inc. v. Safeco Title Ins. Co., 105 Wash. 2d 778, 780,
719 P.2d 531,532-33 (1986).
17. Id.
18. See infra notes 36-40 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 61-64 and accompanying text.
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A. The Enactment, Purpose, and Application of the CPA
In 1960, when the Attorney General of the United States held a
national conference on consumer protection for state attorneys general,'
2
few states had promulgated any significant systems of consumer
protection laws.2' Estimates in Washington at the time determined that
consumers in the state lost approximately $40 million per year to unfair
and deceptive business practices.22 Washington Governor Albert D.
Rosellini established the Citizen's Advisory Council on Consumer
Protection (the Council) to aid the government of Washington in
establishing consumer protection legislation.23  Relying upon the
Council's study and recommendations, 4  the Washington State
Legislature enacted the CPA in 1961 to deter deceptive and fraudulent
acts by businesses and to encourage fair competition. 5
The CPA provides a means of recovery against companies for unfair
business practices.2 6 The CPA regulates all businesses in Washington,
unless another governing board directly exempts specified business acts
from coverage.27 Under the CPA, unfair or deceptive business practices
and unfair competition are unlawful.2 The Legislature limited the
business acts subject to the CPA by declaring that reasonable business
acts and practices and business acts that do not injure the public interest
are not prohibited by the CPA.29
Either the State Attorney General 30 or private individuals 31 may bring
a CPA suit against a business that employs unfair or deceptive practices,
20. WASHINGTON CONSUMER ADVISORY COUNCIL, CONSUMER PROTECTION IN THE STATE OF
WASHINGTON: A REPORT TO GOVERNOR ALBERT D. ROSELLINI 1 (1960).
21. Id. at 2 (finding that California, New York, Texas, and Wisconsin were among the few states
with strong and comprehensive consumer protection laws in place at the time).
22. Governor Rosellini's Press Files, July 1, 1960 (on file with the Washington Law Review)
[hereinafter Press Files]. The Governor's historical files were searched by staff in Olympia; the
resulting documents were sent to the author labeled only as "Governor's Rosellini's Press Files"
with the date.
23. Id.
24. See id. at 1-2.
25. 1961 WASH. LAWS 216 (codified at WASH. REV. CODE §§ 19.86.010-.920 (2000)).
26. See D. Roger Reed, Consumer Protection in Washington: An Overview, 10 GONZ. L. REV.
391, 393-94 (1975).
27. WASH. REV. CODE § 19.86.170; see also Jeffrey M. Koontz, Note, Recent Development,
Washington Lawyers Under the Purview of the State Consumer Protection Act-The
"Entrepreneurial Aspects" Solution, 60 WASH. L. REV. 925, 938 (1985).
28. WASH. REV. CODE § 19.86.020.
29. Id. § 19.86.920.
30. Id. § 19.86.080.
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in order to enjoin the business from further unfair practices and to
recover damages from the business.32 The CPA allows plaintiffs to
recover from companies that engage in unfair or deceptive business
practices.33 A consumer suing under the CPA may receive attorney's fees
and up to ten thousand dollars in treble damages.34 The Legislature
implemented the attorney's fees and treble damages provisions in an
attempt to encourage private citizens to bring suit under the CPA.35
When the CPA was enacted, the Legislature directed courts to
interpret its provisions liberally.36 Courts in Washington have repeatedly
applied this legislative mandate to support a variety of claims under the
CPA.37 Due to this liberal construction, courts have allowed CPA suits
between a variety of parties, including an insurance company against a
chiropractor involved in insurance fraud,38 a physician against a drug
company,39 and a class of consumers against a cruise line.4"
31. Id. § 19.86.090.
32. Id. §§ 19.86.080-.090.
33. See Susan Clyatt Lybeck, Note, Recent Development, New Consumer Protection Private
Action Test: Clarification orFurther Confusion?, 62 WASH. L. REV. 277,278 (1987); see generally
Comment, Reasonable Attorney's Fees and Treble Damages-Balancing the Scales of Consumer
Justice, 10 GONZ. L REV. 593 (1975) (discussing general provisions of the CPA, including
attorneys' fee and treble damages provisions).
34. WASH. REV. CODE § 19.86.090 (providing that plaintiffs may recover "reasonable attorney's
fee[s], and the court may in its discretion, increase the award of damages to an amount not to exceed
three times the actual damages sustained"); see also Press Files, supra note 22, March 20, 1961
("[P]rivate parties may recover damages for injury caused by violations. The measure gives the court
discretion to award triple damages.").
35. See Lybeck, supra note 33, at 278; Koontz, supra note 27, at 937.
36. WASH. REV. CODE § 19.86.920 (2000) (requiring the CPA to be 'liberally construed that its
beneficial purposes may be served"); see also Press Files, supra note 22, March 20, 1961 ("The act
is to be liberally construed to compliment the judicial interpretation of the federal acts .... It will
not forbid reasonable business practices.") (internal quotation marks omitted).
37. See, e.g., Wash. State Physicians Ins. Exch. & Ass'n v. Fisons Corp., 122 Wash. 2d 299, 317,
858 P.2d 1054, 1063 (1993) (allowing CPA suit by physician against pharmaceutical company for
failing to warn that drug could harm patients); Dwyer v. J. L Kislak Mortgage Corp., 103 Wash.
App. 542, 547-48, 13 P.3d 240, 243 (2000) (finding that CPA allowed suit for misleading wording
of mortgage payoff statement); Pickett v. Holland Am. Line-Westours, Inc., 101 Wash. App. 901,
915-21, 6 P.3d 63, 70-73 (2000), review granted, 143 Wash. 2d 1001, 20 P.3d 944 (2001)
(reinstating class for CPA class action suit against cruise line for misleading passengers by calling
passenger fees port charges); First State Ins. Co. v. Kemper Nat'l Ins. Co., 94 Wash. App. 602, 611-
12, 971 P.2d 953, 957-58, (1999), review denied, 138 Wash. 2d 1009, 989 P.2d 1136 (1999)
(allowing excess insurer to bring CPA claim against primary insurer); State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v.
Huynh, 92 Wash. App. 454,459-62, 962 P.2d 854, 857-58 (1998) (permitting business to bring suit
under CPA). But see Short v. Demopolis, 103 Wash. 2d 52, 61-62, 691 P.2d 163, 168-69 (1984)
(holding, despite liberal construction, that the practice of law falls outside the CPA).
38. Huynh, 92 Wash. App. at 458, 962 P.2d at 856-57.
39. Wash. State Physicians, 122 Wash. 2d at 317, 858 P.2d at 1063.
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B. The Five Elements of a CPA Cause of Action
In Hangman Ridge Training Stables, Inc. v. Safeco Title Insurance
Co.,41 the Washington Supreme Court determined that to establish a CPA
claim, a complainant must prove the following: (1) the business engaged
in an "unfair or deceptive act or practice; (2) occurring in trade or
commerce; (3) public interest impact; (4) injury to plaintiff in his or her
business or property; and (5) causation. '42 Failure to demonstrate any of
the five necessary requirements precludes a cause of action under the
CPA.43
To demonstrate the first element of a CPA claim-an unfair or
deceptive act or practice-the complainant must establish that an act or
practice has the capacity to deceive the general public or, alternatively,
that the act is per se unfair or deceptive." Courts do not require a
showing of an intent to deceive in order to establish an unfair or
deceptive act or practice; 45rather, a complainant may show that an act or
practice has the "capacity to deceive" a significant portion of the general
public.46 In the alternative, if a statute or regulation describes an act or
practice as unfair or deceptive, a complainant can establish the unfair or
deceptive requirement per se.47  For example, the Insurance
Commissioner has declared specific acts by insurance companies in the
40. Pickett, 101 Wash. App. at 915-21,6 P.3d at 70-73.
41. 105 Wash. 2d 778, 719 P.2d 531 (1986).
42. Id. at 780, 719 P.2d at 533. For cases employing the five requirements for a CPA cause of
action established in Hangman Ridge, see Hayden v. Mut. of Enumclaw Ins. Co., 141 Wash. 2d 55,
62, 1 P.3d 1167, 1171 (2000); Sing v. John L. Scott, Inc., 134 Wash. 2d 24, 30, 948 P.2d 816, 819
(1997); Leingang v. Pierce County Med. Bureau, 131 Wash. 2d 133, 149, 930 P.2d 288, 296 (1997);
Trask v. Butler, 123 Wash. 2d 835, 845-46, 872 P.2d 1080, 1086 (1994); Seattle Endeavors v.
Mastro, 123 Wash. 2d 339, 349, 868 P.2d 120, 126 (1994); Wash. State Physicians, 122 Wash. 2d at
312, 858 P.2d at 1061; Nelson v. Nat'l Fund Raising Consultants, Inc., 120 Wash. 2d 382, 393, 842
P.2d 473, 478 (1992); Schmidt v. Cornerstone Invest., Inc., 115 Wash. 2d 148, 166, 795 P.2d 1143,
1152 (1990); Indus. Indem. Co. v. Kallevig, 114 Wash. 2d 907, 920-21,792 P.2d 520, 528 (1990);
Mason v. Mortgage Am., Inc., 114 Wash. 2d 842, 852, 792 P.2d 142, 147 (1990); Howell v.
Spokane & Inland Empire Blood Bank, 114 Wash. 2d 42,57,785 P.2d 815, 823 (1990); Saunders v.
Lloyd's of London, 113 Wash. 2d 330, 343, 779 P.2d 249, 256 (1989); Travis v. Wash. Horse
Breeders Ass'n, I ll Wash. 2d 396, 405, 759 P.2d 418, 422 (1988); Nordstrom, Inc. v. Tampourlos,
107 Wash. 2d 735, 739, 733 P.2d 208, 210 (1987).
43. Hangman Ridge, 105 Wash. 2d at 780, 719 P.2d at 532-33.
44. Id. at 785-86, 719 P.2d at 535-36.
45. Id.
46. Id. (emphasis omitted).
47. Id.
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course of claim settlement to be per se unfair or deceptive acts for
purposes of the CPA.48
In cases where the consumer demonstrates that the business used a
standardized contract that has a capacity to deceive, a single act between
an individual consumer and a business can fulfill the unfair or deceptive
act requirement4 9 In Nelson v. National Fund Raising Consultants,
Inc.,5  the court held that the failure of a company to disclose full
contract terms to a single consumer until after the contract was executed
had the capacity to deceive the general public." In Nelson, the operator
of a business failed to disclose the percentage of markup to be paid to the
business until after the consumers were contractually bound.52 The court
found that this failure to disclose the full terms of the contract inherently
had the capacity to deceive. 3
When evaluating the second element of a private CPA claim, courts
have found myriad activities to constitute trade or commerce under the
CPA. 4 The Legislature defined trade or commerce as "the sale of assets
or services, and any commerce directly or indirectly affecting the people
of the state of Washington."55 When applying the statutory definition of
trade or commerce, courts have generally held that the definition should
48. WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 284-30-330 (2001).
49. See Nelson v. Nat'l Fund Raising Consultants, Inc., 120 Wash. 2d 382,392-93, 842 P.2d 473,
478 (1992); see also Potter v. Wilbur-Ellis Co., 62 Wash. App. 318, 327-28, 814 P.2d 670, 674-75
(1991) (determining that deceptive information communicated to single individual through
standardized sales presentation has capacity to deceive general public and fulfills unfair or deceptive
act requirement of CPA).
50. 120 Wash. 2d 382, 842 P.2d 473 (1992).
51. Id. at 392-93, 842 P.2d at 478.
52. Id. at 393, 842 P.2d at 478.
53. Id.
54. See, e.g., Anhold v. Daniels, 94 Wash. 2d 40, 47, 614 P.2d 184, 188 (1980) (deciding that
solicitation to invest in venture is trade or commerce); Dick v. Attorney General, 83 Wash. 2d 684,
686, 512 P.2d 702, 704 (1974) (determining that practice of "drugless healing' fulfills trade or
commerce requirement of CPA); State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Huynh, 92. Wash. App. 454, 469,
962 P.2d 854, 862 (1998) (finding that acts taken to increase profits constitute "trade or commerce"
under CPA); Styrk v. Cornerstone Invs. Inc., 61 Wash. App. 463, 471-72, 810 P.2d 1366, 1371
(1991) (defining acts of attorney during escrow proceedings as trade or commerce); Thomas v.
French, 30 Wash. App. 811, 815-16, 638 P.2d 613, 616-17 (1981), rev'd on other grounds, 99
Wash. 2d 95, 105, 659 P.2d 1097, 1102 (1983) (concluding that sales contract between individuals
that is not exempted from CPA occurs in trade or commerce). But see Short v. Demopolis, 103
Wash. 2d 52, 65-66, 691 P.2d 163, 170-71 (1984) (finding that only "entrepreneurial aspects" of
legal practice are trade or commerce under CPA).
55. WASH. REv. CODE § 19.86.010(2) (2000).
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be construed liberally.16 For example, in Salois v. Mutual of Omaha
Insurance Co., the court determined that the phrase "trade or
commerce" was intended to encompass more than just acts aimed at
inducing a sale and held that the term also includes post-sale acts by
businesses.5 8 In addition to acts meeting the statutory definition of trade
or commerce, the Washington Supreme Court has held that any act or
practice that is per se unfair, 9 as defined by statute or regulation, also
fulfills the trade or commerce element of a CPA claim.
60
A complainant can establish the third element-that the acts affect the
public interest-either by finding a per se public interest or by using the
test established in Hangman Ridge.61 A legislative declaration that an act
is illegal or affects the public interest fulfills the public interest
requirement per se.6" If plaintiffs do not meet per se the public interest
requirement, they can meet this requirement by finding a pattern of
business conduct likely to be repeated or with the potential of affecting
more than one member of the public. 63 Courts use a five-part test to
establish whether the public interest requirement is met by a pattern of
business conduct. Courts look to whether the conduct was part of the
defendant's business, whether the acts are part of a general course of
conduct, whether the repeated acts took place prior to the act involving
the plaintiff, whether there is real potential that the act will be repeated
after the act involving the plaintiff, and whether, if the act was a single
transaction, many consumers were harmed.'
The fourth and fifth elements for a private CPA claim, the injury to
property or business and causation requirements, are closely linked. The
56. See, e.g., Short, 103 Wash. 2d at 56, 691 P.2d at 165-66; Salois v. Mut. of Omaha Ins. Co., 90
Wash. 2d 355, 358, 581 P.2d 1349, 1350 (1978); Tallmadge v. Aurora Chrysler Plymouth, Inc., 25
Wash App. 90, 93, 605 P.2d 1275, 1277 (1979)
57 90 Wash. 2d 355, 581 P.2d 1349 (1978).
58. Id. at 359-60, 581 P.2d at 1351.
59. See supra notes 44-48 and accompanying text. An act is per se unfair or deceptive when it is
specifically defined as an unfair or deceptive act by a state statute or regulation. Hangman Ridge
Training Stables, Inc v. Safeco Title Ins. Co., 105 Wash. 2d 778, 785-86, 719 P2d 531, 535-36
(1986).
60. Hangman Ridge, 105 Wash. 2d at 785-86,719 P.2d at 535.
61. See generally David J. Dove, Washington Survey: Washington Consumer Protection Act-
Public Interest and the Private Litigant, 60 WASH. L. REV. 201 (1984) (discussing per se test, as
well as the Anhold test, precursor to the Hangman Ridge test).
62. Id. at 203; see also Hangman Ridge, 105 Wash. 2d at 791, 719 P.2d at 538.
63. See Hangman Ridge, 105 Wash. 2d at 790-91, 719 P.2d at 538.
64. Id at 790, 719 P.2d at 537-38.
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injury or harm element requires that the plaintiff demonstrate some
degree of actual damage to his or her business or property.6 Emotional
damages associated with business or property damage are not
recoverable under the CPA.67 Finally, the plaintiff must prove that the
defendant's deceptive or misleading acts caused the damage to the
plaintiff. 8 The defendant need not directly contact, solicit, or have
business dealings with the complainant to establish causation. 9
I. THE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT GENERALLY DOES
NOT APPLY TO ACTS OCCURRING IN THE COURSE OF
LITIGATION
The Washington Court of Appeals has found acts occurring in the
course of litigation to be private acts that do not support a CPA cause of
action. Courts recognize an exception, however, where an individual act
constitutes a per se violation. Although courts do not allow CPA claims
for non-per se acts occurring after a suit has been filed, courts may
sanction the party under CR 11 for deceptive acts occurring in the course
of litigation.
A. The Litigation Exception to the CPA
Washington courts have held that, because litigation is a dispute
between private parties, actions occurring during litigation generally
cannot support a cause of action under the CPA.7" Acts occurring purely
between private parties do not demonstrate three of the five necessary
elements of a CPA cause of action: (1) the unfair or deceptive act
requirement; (2) the requirement that the act occur during trade or
commerce; and (3) the public interest requirement.7 Consumers cannot
65. WASH. REV. CODE § 19.86.020 (2000).
66. Hangman Ridge, 105 Wash. 2d at 792, 719 P.2d at 539.
67. Wash. State Physicians Ins. Exch. & Ass'n v. Fisons Corp., 122 Wash. 2d 299, 317-18, 858
P.2d 1054, 1063-64 (1993).
68. Schmidtv. Cornerstone Invest., Inc., 115 Wash. 2d 148,167-68,795 P.2d 1143,1152 (1990).
69. See id.
70. See, e.g., Blake v. Federal Way Cycle Ctr., 40 Wash. App. 302, 312, 698 P.2d 578, 584
(1985).
71. See id. (holding that private litigation fails to establish unfair or deceptive, trade or commerce,
and public interest elements of CPA cause of action); Hangman Ridge, 105 Wash. 2d at 794, 719
P.2d at 539-40 (finding that private acts support neither the unfair or deceptive nor the public
interest requirements).
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show that a private act had the "capacity to deceive" members of the
general public because private acts, by definition, affect private
individuals rather than the public at large.72 Private acts, therefore, fail to
satisfy the unfair or deceptive act requirement. 73 The consumer also
cannot establish that the trade or commerce element extends to
individualized acts aimed at a particular consumer.74 Finally, the
consumer cannot satisfy the public interest requirement because
generally no public impact follows from a private act.75 If, however, the
unfair or deceptive act, trade or commerce, and public interest
requirements can be established as per se violations, a consumer can
establish a suit under the CPA for acts occurring in the course of
litigation.76
Washington's Court of Appeals confronted the problem of a non-per
se CPA suit in the litigation context in Blake v. Federal Way Cycle
Center.77 Blake concerned acts by the defendant corporations Federal
Way Cycle Center (FWCC) and Yamaha Motor Corporation (Yamaha)
that occurred after the plaintiffs, Mr. and Ms. Blake, had filed suit
regarding a Yamaha motorcycle they had purchased from FWCC.78
FWCC and Yamaha requested a continuance. 79 The court granted the
continuance upon the condition that FWCC and Yamaha deposit the
amount that the Blakes had paid for the motorcycle into an interest-
bearing account. 80 The Blakes alleged that failure to make this deposit
violated the CPA.8'
The Blake court determined that acts occurring in the course of
litigation were private disputes that could not support the unfair or
deceptive act, trade or commerce, and public interest requirements of the
CPA.82 In Blake, the actions of FWCC and Yamaha did not violate the
CPA until litigation was commenced." The court determined that the
72. See Hangman Ridge, 105 Wash. 2d at 794, 719 P.2d at 539-40; Blake, 40 Wash. App. at 310-
12, 698 P.2d at 582-84.
73. See Blake, 40 Wash. App. at 310, 698 P.2d at 582-83.
74. Id. at 312, 698 P 2d at 584.
75. Hangman Ridge, 105 Wash. 2d at 794, 719 P.2d at 539-40.
76. Evergreen Collectors v. Holt, 60 Wash. App. 151, 156, 803 P.2d 10, 13 (1991).
77. 40 Wash. App. 302, 699 P 2d 578 (1985).
78. Id. at 304-05, 698 P.2d at 579-80.
79. Id. at 305, 698 P.2d at 580.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. See id. at 312, 698 P.2d at 584.
83. See id. at 311,698 P.2d at 583.
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acts of FWCC and Yamaha occurring after the complainants had filed
suit did not fulfill the unfair or deceptive act requirement because the
actions were aimed directly at the Blakes, did not substantially harm the
Blakes, did not have the capacity to deceive a significant portion of the
general public, and did not appear to have the potential for repetition.84
The plaintiffs could not meet the trade or commerce requirement
because, once they filed suit, the matter was controlled by the courts and
constituted a private dispute between the parties.8 5 The court further held
that the complainants did not meet the public interest requirement as the
alleged acts did not have potential for repetition.86 Because the plaintiffs
in Blake could not establish three of the five elements of a CPA claim,
the court determined that they did not have a valid cause of action for a
non-per se violation of the CPA. 7
In contrast, the Court of Appeals has held that per se violations of the
CPA occurring after litigation has begun can support a CPA cause of
action. In Evergreen Collectors v. Holt,88 the court created an exception
to the rule established in Blake that acts occurring after a suit has been
filed could not give rise to a CPA claim. 9 Evergreen Collectors involved
a collection agency that filed suit against a consumer for costs associated
with collecting money from him.90 Evergreen Collectors threatened to
sue Holt for attorney's fees if he did not settle the case before it went to
trial.9' Holt then filed a CPA claim against Evergreen Collectors for
threatening to sue in an attempt to force settlement of the case.92 The
court determined that the complained of acts affected the public interest
because Evergreen Collectors engaged in acts that were statutorily
defined as unfair or deceptive acts in trade or commerce.93
The court further reasoned that because the business of collection
agencies involves bringing suit against consumers, actions occurring in
the course of litigation should subject collection agencies to CPA
claims. 4 Evergreen Collectors held that where the Legislature has
84. See id.
85. See id. at 312, 698 P.2d at 584.
86. See id.
87. Id.
88. 60 Wash. App. 151, 803 P.2d 10 (1991).
89. Id. at 156-57, 803 P.2d at 13.
90. Id. at 152-54, 803 P.2d at 11-12.
91. Id. at 153-54, 803 P.2d at 12.
92. Id. at 154, 803 P.2d at 12.
93. Id. at 156-57, 803 P.2d at 13.
94. Id.
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determined particular acts to be per se unfair or deceptive for purposes of
the CPA, a consumer can fulfill the unfair or deceptive act, trade or
commerce, and public interest requirements even if the business
participates in such acts in the course of litigation.95 Thus, under
Evergreen Collectors, consumers can bring per se CPA suits against
businesses for acts occurring in the course of litigation.96
B. Alternative Recovery Used for Misleading Acts Occurring in the
Course of Litigation
As recovery is frequently unavailable under the CPA for acts
occurring in the course of litigation, a consumer can instead request
sanctions under Court Rule 11 (CR 11). 9 7 CR 11 requires that the
attorney and the client certify that they have a reasonable and good faith
belief that "pleadings, motions and legal memoranda" are truthful and
are not being filed to harass, delay, or needlessly increase litigation
costs.9' Because its provisions apply to both attorneys and clients who
sign court documents, 99 CR 11, like the CPA, allows for recovery against
businesses for dishonest acts.
The purpose of CR 11 is very different than that of the CPA. While
the CPA protects consumers from unfair and deceptive business acts, CR
11 protects the judicial system from abuse by attorneys and litigants.'
The usual target of sanctions demonstrates this purpose. Although
sanctions can be brought under CR 11 against both the party and the
attorney, courts have determined that CR 11 sanctions serve to deter
attorneys, rather than parties, from abusing the judicial system.' 1 As a
result, courts frequently impose sanctions against only the attorney, and
not the party to the action. 2
95. Id. at 155-57, 803 P.2d at 12-13.
96. Id.
97. See WASH. CR 11 (2001).
98. Id.
99. Id.; see also Rhinehart v. Seattle Times Co., 51 Wash. App 561,581,754 P.2d 1243,1254-55
(1988) (holding that an attorney, a party, or both may be held liable for CR II violations).
100. Neigel v. Harrell, 82 Wash. App. 782, 787, 919 P.2d 630, 632 (1996).
101. Ibarra v. Mount, No. 37383-8-1, 1998 Wash. App. LEXIS 1154, at *19-21 (Wash. App.
Aug. 3, 1998); Suarez v. Newquist, 70 Wash. App. 827, 833, 855 P.2d 1200, 1204 (1993).
102. See. e.g., Bryant v. Joseph Tree, Inc., 119 Wash. 2d 210, 223-25 829 P.2d 1099, 1106-07
(1992). But cf, State ex rel. Quick-Ruben v. Verhamen, 136 Wash. 2d 888, 903-05, 969 P.2d 64,
71-73 (1998).
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The theory behind CR 11 sanctions for violation of court rules stands
in stark contrast to the theory of liberally construing and applying
damages under the CPA. While CR 11 provides for sanctions for failure
to have a reasonable, good faith belief in signed pleadings, motions, and
legal memoranda, °3 the CPA allows recovery for unfair or deceptive
business acts."° Although courts are given a certain amount of discretion
in determining the dollar amount of a CR 11 sanction, judges must
follow court-imposed guidelines to arrive at that amount."0 5 In contrast to
the liberal allowance of treble damages allowed under the CPA,
sanctions under CR 11 must be the smallest amount possible to deter the
bad act."
E[I. THE CPA AND THE INSURANCE INDUSTRY
Insurance relationships are contracts between insurance companies
and their insureds. Commentators have recognized, however, that there is
a differential in the bargaining power between insurance companies and
the individuals they insure. The Legislature empowered the Insurance
Commissioner to develop administrative rules declaring particular
insurance company acts and practices to be per se unfair or deceptive
under the CPA. The resulting regulations, along with other legislative
determinations, combine to enable consumers to establish the five
elements of a CPA claim against insurance companies.
A. The Business of Insurance
The nature of an insurance contract is a promise, on the part of the
insurance company, to provide future benefits to the insured0 7 upon the
occurrence of a contingency.' 8 Although courts recognize no single
definition of what constitutes the insurance business,0 9 the standard
relationship between an insured and an insurance company is based upon
103. WASH. CR 11.
104. WASH. REV. CODE § 19.86.020 (2000).
105. Wash. State Physicians Ins. Exch. & Ass'n v. Fisons Corp., 122 Wash. 2d 299, 355-56, 858
P.2d 1054, 1085 (1993).
106. Id. at 356, 858 P.2d at 1085.
107. PETER M. LENCSiS, INSURANCE REGULATION IN THE UNITED STATES: AN OVERVIEW FOR
BUSINESS AND GOVERNMENT, viii (1997).
108. EMERIC FISCHER& PETER N. SWISHER, PRINCIPLES OF INSURANCE LAW, xxi (1986).
109. See I ERIC MILLS HOLMES & MARK S. RHODES, HOLMES'S APPLEMAN ON INSURANCE 2D
§ 1.4 (1996); FISCHER & SWISHER, supra note 108, at xxi.
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risk allocation.' Claims by insureds for benefits may not settle amicably
and litigation may ensue to enforce payment by the insurance
company."'
Insureds and insurance companies resolve conflicts through litigation
with such frequency that litigation is seen as a normal part of the
insurance industry.'" 2 Washington courts have determined that the
insurance industry, like the collection business, includes litigation in the
ordinary course of business.' For example, the Washington Supreme
Court has declared that it is nearly impossible to determine whether or
not a document was prepared in anticipation of litigation for purposes of
the work-product doctrine, because so much of an insurance company's
normal course of business includes litigation." 4
Some commentators argue that the insurance industry lends itself to
unfair business practices because insurance policies are often long and
complex, include terms standardized throughout the industry, and offer
insureds little opportunity to negotiate.' As insurance companies have
such great power compared to insureds, the possibility of bad faith acts
by insurance companies is great." 6 Therefore, regulations such as the
CPA" 7 ensure that insurance companies deal with their insureds fairly
and honestly."'
110. See HOLMES & RHODES, supra note 109, § 1.4.
111. See TASK FORCE OF THE COMMITTEE ON INSURANCE COVERAGE LITIGATION, SECTION OF
LITIGATION, AMERICAN BAR ASS'N, MANUAL FOR COMPLEX INSURANCE COVERAGE LITIGATION
§5.01 (1993). Such disputes often settle before trial. See id.
112. See, e.g., Heidebrink v. Moriwaki, 104 Wash. 2d 392, 399, 706 P.2d 212, 216 (1985); see
also TASK FORCE OF THE COMMITTEE ON INSURANCE COVERAGE LITIGATION, supra note I 11,
§5.01.
113. See Heidebrink, 104 Wash. 2d at 399, 706 P.2d at 216. For further support of the proposition
that litigation is part of the insurance business, see also Eugene R. Anderson & James J. Foumier,
Why Courts Enforce Insurance Policyholders' Objectively Reasonable Expectations of Insurance
Coverage, 5 CONN. INS. L.J. 335, 383 (1998) ("[L]itigation is the bread and butter of insurance
companies. In large part, litigation is their business.").
114. Heidebrink, 104 Wash. 2d at 399, 706 P.2d at 216.
115. See, e.g., HOLMES & RHODES, supra note 109, §3.4.
116. See FISCHER & SWISHER, supra note 108, at 485.
117. See infra notes 120-79 and accompanying text.
118. See LENCSIS, supra note 107, at viii.
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B. Establishing a CPA Cause ofAction Against Insurance Companies
The Legislature empowered the Insurance Commissioner to enact
regulations governing the insurance industry." 9 Pursuant to that
authority, the Insurance Commissioner enacted a regulation that
identifies particular claim settlement acts or practices as unfair or
deceptive in the business of insurance. 2 Violation of this regulation by
an insurance company establishes per se both the unfair or deceptive act
and trade or commerce requirements of a CPA cause of action.' In
addition, the Legislature has determined that the insurance industry
affects the public interest," which automatically fulfills the public
interest requirement of a CPA claim. "3 Finally, courts have established a
presumption of the harm and causation elements when insurance
companies act in bad faith. 24
1. Pursuant to Statutory Authority, the Insurance Commissioner Has
Promulgated Regulations that Govern the Insurance Industry
Under the CPA
The Insurance Commissioner has expansive authority to regulate the
insurance industry." A primary duty of the Insurance Commissioner's
office is to protect and inform consumers in their dealings with insurance
companies."' To achieve the goal of consumer protection, the Insurance
Commissioner's office supervises the drafting and revision of the
insurance code and also proposes and enforces insurance regulations. 27
Regulations enacted by the Insurance Commissioner establish acts and
practices that are per se unfair and deceptive under the CPA in the
business of insurance with regard to the settlement of claims. 2 By
establishing these per se unfair and deceptive acts and practices, the
119. WASH. REv. CODE § 48.30.010 (2000).
120. WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 284-30-330 (2001).
121. See infra notes 136-44, 150-52 and accompanying text.
122. WASH. REV. CODE § 48.01.030 (2000).
123. See Haner v. Quincy Farm Chem., Inc., 97 Wash. 2d 753, 762, 649 P.2d 828, 833 (1982).
124. See infra notes 167-178 and accompanying text.
125. Tank v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 105 Wash. 2d 381,386,393, 715 P.2d 1133,1136, 1140
(1986).
126. WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 284-02-020(2)-(3) (2001).
127. Id. § 284-02-020(2).
128. Id. § 284-30-330.
Washington Law Review
Insurance Commissioner promotes the goal of consumer protection
embodied by the CPA.
Courts in Washington have upheld the Insurance Commissioner's
authority to promulgate regulations that make specific acts by insurance
companies per se unfair or deceptive.2 9 In Leingang v. Pierce County
Medical Bureau,130 the Washington Supreme Court found that the
Legislature vested valid rule-making authority in the Insurance
Commissioner to determine which insurance company acts and practices
were deceptive.11 The court also discussed the rule-making authority of
the Insurance Commissioner in Tank v. State Farm Insurance &
Casualty Co., 32 and found that the Commissioner had the authority to
determine that a breach of good faith was a deceptive act within the
insurance industry. 3 3 In spite of the broad authority of the Insurance
Commissioner to promulgate rules, courts have retained the power to
interpret and refine the application of those rules.1
34
2. Fulfilling the Unfair or Deceptive and Trade or Commerce
Requirements in Suits Against Insurance Companies
The Washington Administrative Code (WAC) provisions promulgated
by the Insurance Commissioner outline acts that are per se "unfair or
deceptive acts or practices in the business of insurance" for purposes of
claim settlement. 35 The Insurance Commissioner and courts, however,
have not provided a definition of "claim settlement."' 136 The prohibitions
129. See. e.g., Leingang v. Pierce County Med. Bureau, 131 Wash. 2d 133, 151, 930 P.2d 288,
297 (1997); Tank, 105 Wash. 2d at 386, 715 P.2d at 1136; Starczewski v. Unigard Ins. Group, 61
Wash. App. 267, 272-73, 810 P.2d 58, 61 (1991); Neigel v. Harrell, 82 Wash. App. 782, 786, 919
P.2d 630, 632 (1986).
130. 131 Wash. 2d 133, 930 P.2d 288 (1997).
131. Id. at 151-52, 930 P.2d at 297-98 (stating the general rule "that violations of insurance
regulations are subject to the Consumer Protection Act").
132. 105 Wash. 2d 381,715 P.2d 1133 (1986).
133. Id. at 386, 715 P.2d at 1136.
134. See, e.g., id. at 393, 715 P.2d at 1140 (finding that regulations do not apply to third party
claimants); Neigel, 82 Wash. App. at 786-87, 919 P.2d at 632 (1986) (adopting holding from Tank
that third party claimants cannot recover under CPA).
135. WASH. ADMiN. CODE § 284-30-330 (2001).
136. See id.; see also id. at § 284-30-320 (listing insurance code definitions). For examples of
cases that have applied the WAC without defining "claims settlement" see Coventry Assocs. v. Am.
States Ins. Co., 136 Wash. 2d 269, 276, 961 P.2d 933, 935 (1998); Leingang, 131 Wash. 2d at 150-
53, 930 P.2d at 297-98; Indus. Indem. Co. of the N.W. v. Kallevig, 114 Wash. 2d 907, 920-25, 792
P.2d 520, 528-30 (1990); Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Osbom, 104 Wash. App. 686, 698-702, 17
P.3d 1229, 1234-36 (2001).
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listed in the WAC concern misrepresentations by insurance companies, 37
unreasonable acts by insurance companies when dealing with insureds, 3'
lack of good faith on the part of insurance companies,139 and
inappropriate or coercive actions taken by insurance companies during
the course of claims investigation. 4 ' Courts have interpreted these
regulations to mean that any act by an insurance company specified in
the WAC automatically fulfills the unfair or deceptive act or practice
element of the CPA. 4' For a per se violation, an insured need not
establish that the insurance company has a pattern of violating the
WAC.'42 A single violation is sufficient to establish an unfair trade
practice.'
Although most cases brought against insurance companies allege per
se deceptive acts or practices in violation of the WAC, insureds can bring
suits for acts that have the capacity to deceive.'" The CPA explains that
actions by insurance companies are subject to the CPA, unless state
insurance law expressly allows or requires the acts.'45 In Bowers v.
Transamerica Title Insurance Co.,'46 the court held that an insurance
company practicing law without a license had the "capacity to deceive"
the general public. 47 As the acts of the insurance company constituted a
deceptive act or practice in their own right, the court did not need to rely
upon the WAC to establish a claim under the CPA.148 Therefore, the
Insurance Commissioner need not define a specific act as deceptive in
order for the act to be subject to the CPA.
Any act described in the WAC as per se unfair or deceptive fulfills not
only the unfair or deceptive requirement of the CPA, but also the trade or
137. WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 284-30-330(1).
138. Id. § 284-30-330(2)-(5), (16).
139. Id. § 284-30-330(6), (18).
140. Id. § 284-30-330(7)--(15), (17), (19).
141. See, eg., Hayden v. Mut. of Enumclaw Ins. Co., 141 Wash. 2d 55, 62-63, 1 P.3d 1167, 1171
(2000); Anderson v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 101 Wash. App. 323, 331-32, 2 P.3d 1029, 1034-35
(2000), reconsideration denied, No. 44597-9-I, 2000 Wash App. LEXIS 1477 (Wash. App. Aug. 3,
2000), and review denied, motion granted, 142 Wash. 2d 1017,20 P.3d 945 (2001).
142. Indus. Indem. Co. of the N. W. v. Kallevig, 114 Wash. 2d 907, 922-25, 792 P.2d 520, 529-
30(1990).
143. Id.
144. See Hangman Ridge Training Stables, Inc. v. Safeco Title Ins. Co., 105 Wash. 2d 778, 785,
719 P.2d 531,535 (1986).
145. WASH. REV. CODE § 19.86.170 (2000).
146. 100 Wash. 2d 581,675 P.2d 193 (1983).
147. Id. at 591-92, 675 P.2d at 200-01.
148. Id.
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commerce requirement.14 9 The WAC describes acts or practices
occurring in the "business of insurance" that are per se unfair.
50
Washington courts have held that any act that is legislatively determined
to be an unfair trade practice fulfills per se both the unfair or deceptive
and trade or commerce requirements.'
5 1
In addition to meeting per se the trade or commerce requirement for
violations of the WAC, the trade or commerce requirement can also be
established without use of the WAC. The Legislature has broadly defined
trade or commerce to include "any commerce directly or indirectly
affecting the people of the state of Washington."'152 In Salois v. Mutual of
Omaha Insurance Co., 53 the court expanded the definition of trade or
commerce as applied to insurance companies to include deceptive acts
beyond those aimed at inducing a sale.'54 The Salois court held that the
Legislature intended for insurance companies to be held liable even
where the act was not deceptive at the time the insurance policy was
sold. 55 The court reasoned that the CPA created liability for deceptive
actions and bad faith in settling insurance claims as part of the trade or
commerce of the insurance business.1
5 6
3. Determining that the Insurance Industry Is Affected by the Public
Interest
In 1982, the Washington Supreme Court determined that the public
interest requirement is met per se when there is a "specific legislative
declaration" of a public interest. 1' The insurance code declares that "the
business of insurance is one affected by the public interest, requiring that
149. See, e.g., Hangman Ridge, 105 Wash. 2d at 785-86, 719 P.2d at 535.
150. WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 284-30-330 (2001).
151. See, e.g., Hangman Ridge, 105 Wash. 2d at 785-86, 719 P.2d at 535-36.
152. WASH. REV. CODE § 19.86.010 (2000).
153. 90 Wash. 2d 355, 581 P.2d 1349 (1978).
154. Id. at 360-61,581 P.2d at 1351-52.
155. Id. at 359-61,581 P.2d at 1351-52.
156. Id. at 360-61, 581 P.2d at 1351-52. The court stated:
The defendant was not unfair or deceptive in the sale of its policy. But what the plaintiffs
purchased was not the pieces of paper constituting the policy. They purchased the potential
benefits and security of coverage. When defendant should have rendered those benefits, it,
according to the special verdict, engaged in acts of bad faith and breached its duty of fair
dealing.
Id.
157. Haner v. Quincy Farm Chem., Inc., 97 Wash. 2d 753, 762, 649 P.2d 828, 833 (1982).
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all persons be actuated by good faith, abstain from deception, and
practice honesty and equity in all insurance matters."'55 Washington
courts have adopted the statutory assertion that the insurance business
directly concerns the public interest.'59
The Washington Supreme Court has also determined that a quasi-
fiduciary relationship exists between an insured and an insurance
company"6 that requires the insurance company to give the insured's
interests the same consideration it gives its own interests in all matters.
161
Consequently, an insurance company has a duty to "disclose all facts that
would aid its insureds" in asserting a claim for insurance benefits. 62 The
quasi-fiduciary and good faith duties owed by an insurance company to
an insured exist at an even higher level in the context of a first-party
insured, where the interests of the insured are directly opposed to the
interests of the insurance company. 63 In this context, the insured is
especially susceptible to harm should the insurer fail to act in good
faith. 6' The good faith and fiduciary duties insurers owe their insureds
65
further the legislative goal of protecting the general public from
deceptive insurance company business practices.'
66
4. Establishing the Causation and Harm Elements in CPA Cases
Against Insurance Companies
In Safeco Insurance Co. ofAmerica v. Butler,"67 the court recognized a
rebuttable presumption of harm when an insurance company acts in bad
158. WASH. REV. CODE § 48.01.030 (2000).
159. See, eg., Lenzi v. Redland Ins. Co., 140 Wash. 2d 267, 277, 996 P.2d 603, 607-08 (2000);
Coventry Assocs. v. Am. States Ins. Co., 136 Wash. 2d 269, 276, 961 P.2d 933, 935 (1998); Kirk v.
Mt. Airy Ins. Co., 134 Wash. 2d 558, 560, 951 P.2d 1124, 1125 (1998); Indus. Indem. Co. of the
N.W. v. Kallevig, 114 Wash. 2d 907,917,792 P.2d 520, 526 (1990); Tank v. State Farm Fire & Cas.
Co., 105 Wash. 2d 381,386-87,715 P.2d 1133,1136-37 (1986).
160. Van Noy v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 142 Wash. 2d 784, 791-92, 16 P.3d 574, 578
(2001). But see id. at 798-800, 16 P.3d at 582-83 (Talmadge, J., concurring) (finding no fiduciary
duty in first-party insurance context).
161. See id. at 791-92, 16 P.3d 578; CoventryAssocs., 136 Wash. 2d at 280, 961 P.2d at 937-38;
Tank, 105 Wash. 2d at 385-86, 715 P.2d at 1136.
162. Van Noy, 142 Wash. 2d at 791, 16 P.3d at 578. But see id. at 799-800, 16 P.3d 582-83
(Talmadge, J., concurring) (declaring that no such duty exists).
163. Id. at 793 n.2, 16 P.3d at 578 n.2.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. See supra notes 120-60 and accompanying text.
167. 118 Wash. 2d 383, 823 P.2d 499 (1992).
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faith toward an insured. 168 The Butler court determined that the insureds
would have a nearly impossible burden of proving that they were
"demonstrably worse off' as a result of the bad faith without this
presumption.169 In addition, the court found the rebuttable presumption to
be the best means to protect the societal interests implicated by the
insurance industry, such as the fiduciary duty of an insurer to an
insured.171 Courts apply the rebuttable presumption of harm when an
insurance company acts in bad faith in defending an insured under a
reservation of rights,"' in failing to provide a defense for an insured, 7 1 or
in delaying in the reservation of rights for an insured .
Although there are many instances when an insurance company's bad
faith leads to a rebuttable presumption of harm, this rebuttable
presumption does not apply in all situations. There is no rebuttable
presumption of harm when an insurance company, as a result of a bad
faith investigation, refuses to provide coverage to an insured, if it is
eventually determined that the coverage denial was correct."7 In this
instance, harm can be established only if the insured can show that he or
she incurred expenses as a result of the bad faith investigation. 175
Additionally, an insurer that is eventually found liable on an insurance
policy is not presumed to have acted in bad faith. 176
The courts have not discussed directly the causation requirement of a
CPA claim as it relates to the WAC. Generally, a consumer who uses the
WAC to fulfill the unfair or deceptive act and trade or commerce
requirements must establish a causal link between the company's
deceptive act or practice and the harm suffered by the consumer. 77 In
168. Id. at 390, 823 P.2d at 504.
169. Id. (quoting A. WINDT, INSURANCE CLAIMS AND DISPUTES: REPRESENTATION OF
INSURANCE COMPANIES AND INSUREDS § 2.09, at 40-41 (2d ed. 1988)); accord R. KEETON & A.
WIDISS, INSURANCE LAW: A GUIDE TO FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES, LEGAL DOCTRINES, AND
COMMERCIAL PRACTICES § 9.1(c), at 993 (1988).
170. See id. at 389-92, 823 P.2d at 503-05.
171. Id. at 390-92, 823 P.2d at 504-05.
172. Kirk v. Mt. Airy Ins. Co., 134 Wash. 2d 558, 562-63, 951 P.2d 1124, 1127 (1998).
173. Austin Mut. Ins. Co. v. Goodlett, No. 17682-7-111, 1999 Wash. App. LEXIS 2155, at *13
(Dec. 21, 1999), cert. denied, 140 Wash. 2d 1024, 10 P.3d 403 (2000).
174. Coventry Assocs. v. Am. States Ins. Co., 136 Wash. 2d 269, 281-83, 961 P.2d 933, 938-39
(1998).
175. Id.
176. Ellwein v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 95 Wash. App. 419, 425, 976 P.2d 138, 142
(1999).
177. See supra notes 168-77 and accompanying text; see also Hangman Ridge Training Stables,
Inc. v. Safeco Title Ins. Co., 105 Wash. 2d 778, 792-93, 719 P.2d 531, 539 (1986); Strother v.
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cases where a rebuttable presumption of harm exists, courts also seem to
imply a rebuttable presumption of causation,178 which fulfills the
causation requirement of a CPA claim.
IV. THE CPA EXCEPTION FOR ACTS OCCURRING IN THE
COURSE OF LITIGATION SHOULD NOT APPLY TO THE
INSURANCE INDUSTRY
Insureds should be able to bring suit under the CPA against their
insurance companies for acts occurring in the course of litigation. The
litigation exception to the CPA should not apply to insurance companies
due to distinctive Washington case law, statutes, and regulations
governing the insurance industry. Even assuming, arguendo, that the
litigation exception does apply to the insurance industry, Washington
courts have recognized that acts meeting per se the unfair or deceptive,
trade or commerce, and public interest requirements of the CPA are
excluded from the litigation exception to the CPA. As previously noted,
a specialized statutory and regulatory system governs the insurance
industry; therefore, all unfair and deceptive insurance company acts
outlined in the WAC should be exempted from the CPA's litigation
exception. In addition, established Washington policy regarding
insurance companies lends further support to the argument that insurance
companies can be sued under the CPA for their unfair and deceptive acts
occurring in the course of litigation. Finally, CPA claims, as opposed to
CR 11 sanctions, are necessary to provide an insured with sufficient
incentive to bring suit and protect the public interest.
A. The Reasoning ofBlake v. Federal Way Cycle Center Is
Inapplicable in the Insurance Context
The court in Blake v. Federal Way Cycle Center79 determined that the
unfair or deceptive, trade or commerce, and public interest requirements
Capitol Bankers Life Ins. Co., 68 Wash. App. 224, 244, 842 P.2d 504, 514 (1992), rev'd on other
grounds, 124 Wash. 2d 1,873 P.2d 1185 (1994).
178. See, eg., Coventry Assocs., 136 Wash. 2d at 285, 961 P.2d at 940 (holding that there is
sufficient causation for a CPA claim due to presumption of harm for bad faith investigation by
insurance company, even though policy excluded coverage); Kirk v. Mt. Airy Ins. Co., 134 Wash. 2d
558, 562-64, 951 P.2d 1124, 1126-28 (1998) (arguing that in insurance context courts must "set
aside traditional rules regarding harm and contract damages because insurance contracts are
different" and finding that bad faith of insurance companies "causes harm" due to bad faith breach of
contract).
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could not be met to establish a CPA claim for acts occurring in the
course of litigation."' Nevertheless, this litigation exception should not
apply in the insurance context. In Blake, the court reasoned that litigation
was a private conflict between two parties that could not support a CPA
claim. '' In the insurance company context, however, an insured should
be able to establish, without fulfilling per se any of the categories, the
unfair or deceptive, trade or commerce, and public interest requirements
for acts occurring in the course of litigation.8 2 As such, an insured
should be able to sustain a cause of action for acts by an insurance
company occurring during litigation. In addition, Washington courts
have already established a rebuttable presumption of harm, and impliedly
causation, in the insurance context, 83 thus enabling an insured to satisfy
all five elements of a CPA cause of action.
The Blake court's reasoning-that the unfair or deceptive requirement
is not met by acts occurring during litigation-should not apply in the
context of insurance litigation because an insurance company's failure to
honor a standardized contract creates the capacity to deceive the general
public. Washington courts have held that a single deceptive act between
a consumer and a business can support a CPA cause of action if the act
involves a standardized sales presentation or form contract.'84 Most
insurance transactions include the use of standardized contracts
employed throughout the industry and offering the same promise: to
provide benefits to the insured in the case of a contingent occurrence."'
Therefore, the failure of an insurance company to provide benefits to an
insured, as promised in a standardized insurance contract, creates a
capacity to deceive the general public and satisfies the unfair or
deceptive requirement of the CPA.
The Blake court's reasoning that the trade or commerce element
cannot be met for acts occurring during the course of litigation should
not apply to insurance companies given the distinctive nature of the
insurance business. The Blake court held that acts occurring after a suit is
filed are under the domain of the courts and, thus, are no longer in the
179. 40 Wash. App. 302, 698 P.2d 578 (1985).
180. Id. at 312, 698 P.2d at 584.
181. Id.
182. See supra Part II1.B.2.
183. See supra Part III.B.4.
184. See, e.g., Nelson v. Nat'l Fund Raising Consultants, Inc., 120 Wash. 2d 382, 392-93, 842
P.2d 473, 477-78 (1992).
185. See HOLMES & RHODES, supra note 109, §3.4, at 159.
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realm of trade or commerce."i 6 In the insurance industry, however,
disputes frequently arise between insureds and insurers that cannot be or
are not settled before a suit is filed." 7 This occurs to such an extent that
Washington courts have declared litigation to be part of the usual
business of insurance.l'8 As litigation is a part of the insurance business,
acts by insurance companies occurring in the course of litigation satisfy
the liberally-construed Washington definition of trade or commerce,
which includes acts beyond those aimed at inducing a sale.'89
Blake's reasoning that acts occurring in the course of litigation cannot
fulfill the public interest requirement is less persuasive in the insurance
context, because the insurance industry has been determined by statute to
affect the public interest. The business in Blake, selling motorcycles, has
no impact on the public interest beyond the general purview of the
CPA. 9 In contrast, the Legislature has statutorily defined the insurance
business as an industry that affects the public interest.'9' Furthermore,
Washington courts have consistently upheld the Legislature's
determination that the insurance industry affects the public interest. 9
Therefore, an insured should be able to establish the third element of a
CPA cause of action.
The Blake court does not directly address whether a consumer can
fulfill the harm and causation requirements of a CPA cause of action
when the company's acts occur in the course of litigation. 93 Other
Washington court decisions, however, indicate that an insured can
establish the harm and causation requirements against insurance
companies for acts occurring in the course of litigation.'94 The
Washington Supreme Court has established a rebuttable presumption of
harm when an insurance company acts in bad faith.9 This rebuttable
186. Blake, 40 Wash. App. at 312, 698 P.2d at 584.
187. See supra notes 107-14 and accompanying text.
188. See, eg., Heidebrink v. Moriwaki, 104 Wash. 2d 392, 399, 706 P.2d 212, 216 (1985).
189. See supra notes 54-60 and accompanying text.
190. See generally Blake, 40 Wash. App. 302, 698 P.2d 578.
191. WASH. REV. CODE § 48.01.030 (2000).
192. See, eg., Lenzi v. Redland Ins. Co., 140 Wash. 2d 267, 277, 996 P.2d 603, 607-08 (2000);
Coventry Assocs. v. Am. States Ins. Co., 136 Wash. 2d 269, 276, 961 P.2d 933, 935 (1998); Kirk v.
Mt. Airy Ins. Co., 134 Wash. 2d 558, 560, 951 P.2d 1124, 1125 (1998); Indus. Indem. Co. of the
N.W. v. Kallevig, 114 Wash. 2d 907, 917, 792 P.2d 520, 526 (1990); Tank v. State Farm Fire & Cas.
Co., 105 Wash. 2d 381, 386-87, 715 P.2d 1133, 1136-37 (1986).
193. See generally Blake, 40 Wash. App. 302, 698 P.2d 578.
194. See supra note 167-78 and accompanying text.
195. Safeco Ins. Co. v. Butler, 118 Wash. 2d 383, 390, 823 P.2d 499,503-04 (1992).
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presumption of harm has been used by courts to imply a rebuttable
presumption of causation. 9 6 Therefore, proof of bad faith insurance
company acts in the course of litigation would satisfy both the harm and
causation requirements of a CPA claim. 197
B. The WAC Allows Insureds to Use the Per Se Exception of
Evergreen Collectors v. Holt To Bring Suit Against Insurance
Companies for Acts Occurring During Litigation
Assuming, arguendo, that the insurance industry does fall under the
purview of Blake's litigation exception to the CPA, the Blake exception
would not apply to the insurance industry for acts that the Legislature or
an administrative agency has determined to be per se unfair or
deceptive.'98 Like the collection business addressed in Evergreen
Collectors v. Holt,'99 Washington regulations and statutes establish per se
the unfair or deceptive act, trade or commerce, and public interest
requirements to a CPA cause of action."' 0 Thus, in the insurance context,
a complainant could satisfy per se the required elements of a CPA claim
when the insurance company's acts occur during litigation.
The WAC outlines specific acts by insurance companies, for purposes
of "the settlement of claims" that fulfill per se the unfair or deceptive and
trade or commerce requirements of the CPA.20 ' The WAC does not
provide a definition for "the settlement of claims," ' and courts that have
applied the WAC have not attempted to explain what acts constitute
claim settlement.0 3 As a result, no controlling definition of claim
settlement has been established in Washington.
196. See supra notes 177-178 and accompanying text.
197. The individual attorney must decide whether it would be in the best interests of the client to
amend the current complaint by adding a CPA claim for the acts occurring in the course of litigation
or to file a separate CPA claim against the insurer.
198. See Evergreen Collectors v. Holt, 60 Wash. App. 151, 156-57, 803 P.2d 10, 13 (1991).
199. 60 Wash. App. 151, 803 P.2d 10 (1991).
200. See supra Part III.B.2-3.
201. WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 284-30-330 (2001); see also supra Part III.B.2.
202. WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 284-30-330; see also id. at § 284-30-320 (listing insurance code
definitions).
203. See, e.g., Coventry Assocs. v. Am. States Ins. Co., 136 Wash. 2d 269, 276, 961 P.2d 933,
935 (1998); Leingang v. Pierce County Med. Bureau, 131 Wash. 2d 133, 150-53, 930 P.2d 288,
297-98 (1997); Indus. Indem. Co. of the N. W. v. Kallevig, 114 Wash. 2d 907, 920-21, 792 P.2d
520, 528 (1990); Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Osbom, 104 Wash. App. 686, 698-702, 17 P.3d 1229,
1234-36 (2001).
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Although the Washington courts and Legislature have been silent on
the issue of claim settlement, commentators have indicated that insurance
claims frequently result in litigation.2 Because an insurance policy is
based in contract, the insured pays the insurer consideration, so that, if a
contingent event occurs, an insured can make a claim against the insurer
to perform the contract.25 In addition to regular contractual duties,
insurers owe their insureds a duty of good faith and fair dealing as part of
the insurance agreement, °6 which requires the insurance company to
settle an insurance claim when liability to the insured is apparent.0 7
However, instead of settling claims when they are clearly liable,
insurance companies often consider litigation just another step in the
cost-benefit analysis used in the settlement of claims by insureds 05 In
other words, for insurance companies, litigation is merely an alternate
form of claim settlement.
If claim settlement encompasses litigation, the regulation of claim
settlement practices should apply to acts occurring in the course of
litigation. An insurance company should not be able to avoid its duties to
its insureds simply because the insured has filed suit against the
insurance company and the insurance company's acts occur in the course
of litigation. Thus, insureds involved in a lawsuit against their insurance
companies are owed the same duties as those who are involved in
informal settlement negotiations. 9 Therefore, because settlement in the
insurance industry carries over into litigation, the WAC's description of
unfair or deceptive acts in "the settlement of claims"21 should include
acts occurring in the course of litigation.
Because filing a suit does not terminate the duties of an insurance
company, the WAC may be used to establish a cause of action against an
204. See Anderson & Fournier, supra note 113, at 382-83, 398; Roger C. Henderson, The Tort of
Bad-Faith in First-Party Insurance Transactions: Refining the Standard of Culpability and
Reformulating the Remedies by Statute, 26 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 1, 21 (1992); Hugh A. Linstrom,
Unfair Claims Settlement Practices: A Summary of California Law, 15 WHITTIER L. REv. 691, 696-
97 (1994); Alan I. Widiss, Obligating Insurers to Inform Insureds About the Existence of Rights and
Duties Regarding Coveragefor Losses, 1 CONN. INS. L.J. 67, 90 (1995).
205. See Linstrom, supra note 204, at 696-97; Anderson & Foumier, supra note 113, at 379-81;
see also supra notes 107-108 and accompanying text.
206. See Anderson & Foumier, supra note 113, at 379-80.
207. See Henderson, supra note 204, at 21.
208. See Anderson & Fournier, supra note 113, at 382-83, 398.
209. See Alan I. Widiss, supra note 204, at 90 ("The involvement of an attorney on behalf of an
insured does not, and should not, affect (the] responsibilities of an insurance company.").
210. WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 284-30-330 (2001).
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insurance company for acts occurring in the course of litigation. The
WAC establishes, per se, both the unfair or deceptive act"1 and the trade
212
or commerce requirements, even in cases where a single deceptive act
occurs between an insurance company and an individual insured. t 3
Insureds can also rely upon the legislative pronouncement that insurance
affects the public interest 14 to establish the third CPA element in suits
against insurance companies in the litigation context. By demonstrating
an insurer's bad faith during litigation, an insured could prove a violation
of the WAC, thereby establishing per se the first three elements of a CPA
claim. Fulfilling per se the first three elements of a CPA cause of action
would allow the insured to bring suit under Evergreen Collectors. 5
Thereafter, insureds would need only demonstrate the causation and
harm requirements.. 6 to bring suit under the CPA for acts committed in
the course of litigation.
C. Established Washington Policy Regarding Insurance Companies
Supports Allowing CPA Claims for Acts Occurring After a Suit Has
Been Filed
Permitting CPA suits for acts occurring once a suit has been filed
would recognize the enhanced duty of good faith and quasi-fiduciary
duties insurance companies owe their insureds. The Washington
Supreme Court has broadly defined the duty of good faith on the part of
insurance companies and has not limited this duty to events prior to the
development of an adversarial relationship between the insurer and the
insured.1 7 The Legislature has determined that the duty of good faith
applies in all insurance matters.2 '8 During litigation, the interests of the
insurance company and the interests of the insured are at odds; however,
the duty of good faith still applies due to the public interests affecting the
insurance industry.1 9 Washington courts have not excused insurance
211. See supra notes 135-44 and accompanying text.
212. See supra notes 149-51 and accompanying text.
213. Indus. Indem. Co. of the N.W. v. Kallevig, 114 Wash. 2d 907, 922-25, 792 P.2d 520, 529-
30 (1990).
214. WASH. REV. CODE § 48.01.030 (2000).
215. Evergreen Collectors v. Holt, 60 Wash. App. 151, 154-57, 803 P.2d 10, 12-13 (1991).
216. See supra Part 11.B.4.
217. Van Noyv. State Farm Mut. Automobile Ins. Co., 142 Wash. 2d 784, 791, 16 P.3d 574, 578
(2001). But see id. at 799-800, 16 P.3d 582-83 (Talmadge, J., concurring).
218. WASH. REV. CODE § 48.01.030.
219. See supra Part 111.B.3.
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companies from acting in good faith toward their insureds, even in the
adversarial relationship of litigation."
Not only have courts recognized a duty of good faith in all insurance
dealings, they have also found that this duty is enhanced when applied to
insurance company actions directed against their insureds."1 This
enhanced duty requires that, in all insurance matters, insurance
companies give the interests of their insureds the same consideration they
would give their own interests.' Allowing insureds to bring suit against
their insurance companies for unfair and deceptive acts occurring in the
course of litigation would serve to support the enhanced duty of good
faith owed by insurance companies.
The quasi-fiduciary duty of insurance companies to insureds applies to
acts in the course of litigation and a breach of such duty should allow for
suit to be brought against the insurance company under the CPA. In
addition to requiring that insurance companies give the interests of their
insureds the same consideration that they would give their own
interests,' this duty also requires insurance companies to give insureds
access to all information that would aid the insured in making a claim for
benefits under an insurance policy. 4 Courts have not determined that
these quasi-fiduciary requirements apply only prior to the filing of a suit
by an insured.' Therefore, if an insurance company were to withhold
;vital information in the course of litigation, the company would violate
its duty to insureds and should be liable under the CPA.
D. The Recovery Available Under the CPA is Necessary To Give
Insureds an Incentive To Protect the Public from Insurance
Companies that Act in Bad Faith
Remedies under the CPA for deceptive acts occurring after litigation
commences against an insurance company would serve to protect the
220. See, e.g., Kirk v. Mt. Airy Ins. Co., 134 Wash. 2d 558, 562,951 P.2d 1124, 1126-27 (1998);
Tank v. State Farm Fire& Cas. Co., 105 Wash. 2d 381,386,715 P.2d 1133, 1136 (1986).
221. Tank, 105 Wash. 2d at385-86,715 P.2d at 1136-37.
222. Id.
223. See Coventry Assocs. v. Am. States Ins. Co., 136 Wash. 2d 269, 280, 961 P.2d 933, 937-38
(1998); Tank, 105 Wash. 2d at 385-86, 715 P.2d at 1135-36.
224. Van Noy v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 142 Wash. 2d 784, 791, 16 P.3d 574, 578
(2001). But see id. at 799-800, 16 P.3d 582-83 (Talmadge, J., concurring).
225. See, eg., id. at 793 n.2, 16 P.3d at 579 n.2 (finding that duty of insurer to insured may be
heightened when interests of the two parties are at odds). But see id. at 799-800, 16 P.3d 582-83
(Talmadge, J., concurring).
Washington Law Review
public from future harm by insurance companies. The Washington
Legislature established the CPA to protect consumers, 26 but CR 11
sanctions protect only the judicial system.227 Allowing suits under the
CPA against insurance companies for bad acts occurring in the course of
litigation would provide greater protection for the public than CR 11
sanctions alone provide.
CR 11 sanctions do not allow individuals the same liberal recovery as
the CPA. CR 11 allows recovery only of the smallest amount possible to
deter the bad act,22 8 as the rule was not enacted to deter future harm to the
public at large. In addition, the language of CR 11 does not require
courts to impose sanctions payable to the opposing party,229 so the
insured may not receive any recovery from CR 11 sanctions. In addition,
CR 11 sanctions are often payable by the attorney, rather than the
represented business, 3 ' so such fines may not provide insurance
companies with an incentive to curb bad acts during the course of
litigation.
Recovery under the CPA for deceptive acts occurring during litigation
is more likely to have a deterrent effect upon insurance companies than
are CR 11 sanctions. Under a private CPA claim, the insurance company
may have to pay as much as treble damages and reasonable attorneys'
fees directly to the consumer"' Also, the offending insurance company,
rather than the attorney, pays recovery for acts taken during litigation
that violate the CPA, as the insurance company is the party to the
action. 32 When an insurance company's bad faith occurs only in the
course of litigation, recovery under the CPA ensures that an insurance
company will be liable to the same degree, and with the same deterrent
226. See generally Dove, supra note 61.
227. Neigel v. Harrell, 82 Wash. App. 782, 787, 919 P.2d 630, 632 (1996).
228 See Wash. State Physicians Ins. Exch. & Ass'n v. Fisons Corp, 122 Wash. 2d 299, 355-56,
858 P.2d 1054, 1085 (1993).
229. WASH. CR 11 (2001) ("[T]he court, upon motion or upon its own initiative, may impose
upon the person who signed it, a represented party, or both, an appropriate sanction, which may
include an order to pay to the other party or parties the amount of the reasonable expenses
incurred.") (emphasis added).
230. See, e.g., Bryant v Joseph Tree, Inc., 119 Wash. 2d 210, 223-24, 829 P.2d 1099, 1106
(1992). But cf, State ex rel. Quick-Ruben v. Verhamen, 136 Wash. 2d 888, 905, 969 P.2d 64, 73
(1998) (requiring party who filed a premature action to pay attorneys' fees of opposing party).
231. WAsH. RBv. CODE § 19.86.090 (2000). Treble damages, however, are capped at $10,000. Id.
232. See Loveridge v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 125 Wash. 2d 759, 764, 887 P.2d 898, 900 (1995) ("[Al
judgment is binding upon parties to the litigation and persons in privity with those parties.").
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effect, that the company would have been liable for deceptive acts
occurring prior to litigation.
The CPA is needed, in addition to CR 11 sanctions, to protect the
public from harm that occurs when insurance companies act unfairly or
deceptively during litigation. The Washington Legislature has noted,233
and the courts have repeatedly affirmed, 4 that the business of insurance
greatly affects the public interest. The CPA provides financial recovery
substantial enough for individual insureds to bring suit against insurance
companies that act unfairly and dishonestly in the course of litigation,
which serves to protect the public from these harmful acts. Allowing
these suits supports the policies behind the CPA, 5 and provides a
mechanism to enforce the duties owed by insurance companies to their
insureds. 6 By themselves, CR 11 suits are insufficient for this
purpose. 7
V. CONCLUSION
The litigation exception to the CPA should not apply to the insurance
industry. Therefore, insureds should be able to sue their insurance
companies under the CPA for its bad faith acts occurring in the course of
litigation. Blake should not bar suits by insureds against insurance
companies for acts occurring in the course of litigation, as the unfair or
deceptive, trade or commerce, and public interest requirements should be
able to be fulfilled in the insurance context. Alternatively, a cause of
action may lie under the CPA where specific deceptive acts of an
insurance company fall into one of the categories outlined in the WAC.
Established Washington policies regarding insurance companies warrant
a CPA cause of action for deceptive acts occurring during litigation. If
the claim of an insured is denied due to an insurance company's
deception in the course of litigation, the insured has little recourse
against the insurance company. The CPA was enacted to protect
consumers in situations where they had little power and little recourse.
233. WASH. REV. CODE § 48.01.030 (2000).
234. See, eg., Lenzi v. Redland Ins. Co., 140 Wash. 2d 267, 277, 996 P.2d 603, 607-08 (2000);
Coventry Assocs. v. Am. States Ins. Co., 136 Wash. 2d 269, 276, 961 P.2d 933, 935 (1998); Kirk v.
Mt. Airy Ins. Co., 134 Wash. 2d 558, 560, 951 P.2d 1124, 1125 (1998); Indus. Indem. Co. of the N.
W. v. Kallevig, 114 Wash. 2d 907, 917, 792 P.2d 520, 526 (1990); Tank v. State Farm Fire & Cas.
Co., 105 Wash. 2d 381, 386-87, 715 P.2d 1133, 1136-37 (1986).
235. See supra Part IV.C.
236. See supra Part lI.B.3.
237. See supra Part IV.D.
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Therefore, the purpose of the CPA would best be served-and the
interests of the public would best be protected-by allowing insureds to
bring CPA suits against insurance companies for unfair or deceptive acts
occurring in the course of litigation.
